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MORTGAGE DEFICIENCY DECREES: CONCLUSIVE PRESUMPTIONS
OF PROPERTY VALUE UNDER FLORIDA'S STATUTORY
FORECLOSURE PROCEDURE
Bobby Jones GardenApartments, Inc. v. ConnecticutMutual Life
Insurance Co., 202 So. 2d 226 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1967)
Plaintiff sought foreclosure of a mortgage in the principal sum of 820,000
dollars.' At the foreclosure sale, plaintiff's 700,000 dollar bid was the
highest submitted. Defendant failed to object to the sale price during the
allotted ten-day period, and the clerk issued plaintiff a certificate of title.2 At
the hearing on plaintiff's motion for a deficiency decree, the court refused to
consider defendant's testimony regarding the value of the property since
the sale price is conclusively presumed to be final if no objections are filed
within ten days of the sale. 3 The chancellor entered a deficiency decree in
favor of plaintiff for the full amount. Defendant's interlocutory appeal sought
reversal of the chancellor's refusal to hear the offered testimony. The Second
District Court of Appeal HELD, reversing the trial court, that the foreclosure
sale price does not conclusively establish the value of the property for the purpose of barring evidence of higher value offered by a defendant against whom
a deficiency is sought, even though the defendant has failed to make a timely
objection to the sale.
Florida provides a statutory alternative to the common law foreclosure
action. 4 Section 702.02 (5) of the Florida Statutes provides that in a foreclosure sale: "The value of the property . . . shall be conclusively presumed
to be the amount bid . . . unless objections thereto shall be filed . . . within

ten days...." Prior to this 1953 enactment, Florida case law on the conclusiveness of the foreclosure sale price involved such variables as the forum,
the identity of the purchaser at the sale, and whether the defendant received
constructive or actual notice.5 These factual variables precluded formation of
a firm judicial rule. It appears that the purpose of the 1953 enactment was
to remove this uncertainty without deviating substantially from existing
case law.
Although the statute is clearly worded, its meaning has been expanded by
two district courts of appeal. The instant court, in Matz v. O'Connell, noting
that a nonresident defendant was foreclosed after constructive notice by publication, held that lack of residence and actual notice caused the foreclosure
to become an in rem proceeding 6 "without any binding force, except as to
property ... within the state ....
. The court felt the statute's constitution1.
2.
3.
4.

FLA. STAT. §702.02 (1967).
FLA. STAT. §702.02 (5) (1967).

Id.
FLA.

STAT.

§702.02 (5) (1967).

5. Note, Florida Mortgage Deficiency Judgments: Conclusiveness of Foreclosure Sale
Price in Determining Sale Price Deficiency, 17 U. FLA. L. REV. 256, 261 (1964).

6. 155 So. 2d 705, 708 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1963), citing Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 725
(1877).
7. 155 So. 2d 705, 708 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1963).
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ality could be protected only by -preventing conclusive application of the
findings of an in rem foreclosure to an in personam deficiency proceeding
against a nonresident.
In Kurkiian v. Fish Carburetor Co., where the plaintiff-mortgagee purchased the property, the First District Court of Appeal found that since
statutory sale confirmation procedure does not require judicial review, a
departure from the statute's clear language was appropriate in deficiency proceedings in order to admit evidence of inadequacy of price.8 At common law,
judicial confirmation is a continuation of a foreclosure final decree 9 and is
equivalent to a judicial finding that the sale was proper. 10 After confirmation,
the value of the property is conclusively presumed to be the sale price. 1
Under the statutory procedure, however, unless objections are entered within
ten days, sales are confirmed by operation of law without necessity for judicial
2
review of any circumstances of the sale, including adequacy of the sale price.1
The Kurkjian court held, therefore, that sound judicial discretion based upon
equitable principles required the chancellor to inquire into all facts and
circumstances of the sale prior to entering a deficiency decree. Kurkjian
further stated that relevant evidence offered by a defendant from whom a
deficiency is sought should be admissible, though the price might well be
conclusively presumed adequate to support the purchaser's title (regardless
of his identity).s
Kurkiian thus construed section 702.02 (5) to require finality of an uncontested sale price for purposes of the purchaser's title, but not for purposes
of subsequent deficiency proceedings by a purchaser-mortgagee against the
mortgagor. In the instant case, defendant urged that Kurkjian be followed,
but plaintiff contended that the statute's clear wording and the weight of
Florida case law prevented such judicial construction.
Plaintiff also contended that Kurkjian had been overruled in Southern
Realty & Utilities Corp. v. Belmont Mortgage Corp. where the supreme court
stated that the Kurkjian rationale is "in absolute conflict with our holding in
Penn Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Moscovitz."14 This statement swayed the
trial chancellor's ruling in the instant case, but on appeal, the court noted that
the precise issue of a conclusive presumption of value was not before the
8. 145 So. 2d 523 (1st D.CA. Fla. 1962).
9. Southern Realty & Utilities Corp. v. Belmont Mortgage Corp., 186 So. 2d 24 (Fla.
1966); Mabson v. Christ, 96 Fla. 756, 119 So. 131 (1928). See generally 22 FLA. JUm. Mortgages

§3864 (1958).
10. Southern Realty & Utilities Corp. v. Belmont Mortgage Corp., 186 So. 2d 24 (Fla.
1966); Mitchell v. Mason, 75 Fla. 679, 79 So. 163 (1918). See generally 22 FLA. Jim. Mortgages

§364 (1958).
11. Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Moscovitz, 119 Fla. 708, 161 So. 80 (1935); Jacksonville

Loan & Ins. Co. v. National Mercantile Realty & Improvement Co., 77 Fla. 825, 82 So. 292
(1919).

12. FLA. STAT. §702.02 (5) (1967).
13. Kurkjian v. Fish Carburetor Co., 145 So. 2d 523 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1962).
14. Southern Realty & Utilities Corp. v. Belmont Mortgage Corp., 186 So. 2d 24, 25
(1966). The supreme court did not expressly refer to Kurkjian. The district court, how-

ever cited Kurkijan as primary authority for the proposition that "I]he amount bid at
a foreclosure sale does not conclusively establish the value of the property..... Id.
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supreme court for adjudication in Southern Realty and dismissed this dicta
as merely a device used by the court to assume certiorari jurisdiction under
the conflict of decisions rule."5

Plaintiff relied principally on the Florida Supreme Court's decision in
Penn Mutual.16 In Penn Mutual, plaintiff-mortgagee sued for deficiency
after it purchased the property as sole bidder at the foreclosure sale. Defendant there contended that the sum bid did not represent the full value
of the property, but the court held that the sale price was conclusive in the
deficiency proceeding since it had been duly confirmed by the chancellor.
The instant case is remarkably similar factually to Penn Mutual. In both
cases defendants received notice of the sale, yet failed to participate in the
bidding and failed to object to confirmation of the sale price. The distinguishing fact was that the sale in Penn Mutual was confirmed judicially
under the common law procedure, but the sale in the instant case was confirmed merely by operation of statute without judicial review of the sale price.
Both the present case and Kurkjian, relied on this distinction in holding the
sale price not final for purposes of deficiency proceedings.
The instant court further stated that defendant's failure to protect himself by bidding at the sale or resisting its confirmation should not operate to
waive his right to judicial review of the sale price in deficiency proceedings.
The court contended there would normally have been little reason to foreclose if defendant could have paid the mortgage. For him to engage in sham
bidding to increase the sale price of the property would merely delay the inevitable and could well result in embarrassment. The court further noted the
futility of resisting confirmation since courts refuse to invalidate sales on
the basis of price alone unless the inadequacy is so great as to shock the
chancellor's conscience.17
In spite of the district court's interpretations, there are highly plausible
arguments to the contrary that warrant a closer examination. First, section
702.02 (5) of the Florida Statutes codifies the case law of Florida prior to 1953.
Therefore, Penn Mutual, factually similar to the instant case, should have
been followed. Second, the ten-day period allowed for contesting the sale
is designed to soften the blow of confirmation by operation of law as opposed
to confirmation by judicial review, which can occur immediately after the
sale. Since the defendant failed to resist confirmation, it may be argued that
his own laches is responsible for his predicament. Third, since a mortgagor
assumes the risk of foreclosure when he encumbers his property, 8 it may be
contended that the legislature realized that mortgagors would be hurt by
market depression.' 9 Florida never enacted moratory legislation limiting
foreclosures as did many states in the wake of the depression,' - 0 and this may
15.
16.

17.
1937);
18.
19.
20.

Sunad, Inc. v. City of Sarasota, 122 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 1960).
119 Fla. 708, 161 So. 80 (1935).

Certain Lands, Etc. v. City of Coronado Beach, 128 Fla. 884, 175 So. 774 (Fla.
Mitchell v. Mason, 75 Fla. 679, 79 So. 163 (Fla. 1918).
Note, supra note 5, at 264.
Id. at 266.
See generally 22 FLA. JUR. Mortgages §299 (1958).
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indicate its intent to favor strict enforcement of mortgage obligations. Finally,
the proviso in section 702.02 (5) stating that an objection to confirmation will
not cloud the purchaser's title is inserted in the nature of an addition to the
primary purpose of the statute, which may be argued to be finality of
21
sale price for all purposes.
These points of contention are unresolved, and Florida mortgage law
will continue as a source of bewilderment until a definitive decision is
rendered by the Florida Supreme Court. Perhaps it is only through a
weighing of the transcendent policy considerations, predicated upon fairness
to mortgagor and mortgagee alike, that the conflict will be resolved. Undoubtedly the possibility of the mortgagee receiving the property as well as
a healthy deficiency decree influenced the decision of the district court. 22 It is
possible, however, to reach a higher plane of decision that comprehends the
often gross inadequacies of the foreclosure by sale system. As stated by the
court, it must always be kept in mind that "the basic purpose of foreclosure
is to fully subject the security pledged to the payment of the obligation involved ...... This purpose is not satisfied by a system that seldom disposes
of land at its true value. Statutes providing better notice to the public of
forthcoming sales and longer periods for interested parties to raise sufficient
funds for purchases would partially alleviate the problem. Also, some means
of communicating the state of the property's title to the public before the
sale would be beneficial. Not until a system is devised that serves this "basic
purpose" will judges cease to jealously protect their right to prevent inequities
through sound judicial discretion. As stated by the Second District Court of
Appeal: "[W]e are of the opinion that it [the legislature] could not, even
intentionally, deprive an equity court of its power and responsibility to
prevent unfairness, injustice, and fraud."
FRANK

H. FEE, III

21. FLA. STAT. §702.02 (5) (1967); Note, supra note 5, at 259.
22. Note, supra note 5, at 268.
Editor's Note: The Supreme Court of Florida denied certiorari in the principal case
December 11, 1967. A petition for rehearing of this denial was pending at the time of
publication.
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